Introduction
The aim of this research project is to investigate the nature and extent of voluntary intellectual capital disclosures which are made by biotechnology companies. This is done in the context of Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , and traditional Agency Theory variables were used to investigate potential drivers of voluntary intellectual capital disclosures by management of these firms.
Biotechnology companies are a fascinating example of firms with intangible value. This intangible value can include: a skilled workforce; highly collegial R&D oriented culture; public benevolent motivations and outcomes; registered intellectual property; proprietary techniques and IT applications; and, highly innovative strategic alliances.
Intellectual capital reporting about the nature of a firm's intangible assets is an important way of bridging the information gap which may exist between managers and firm owners (Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995) . This information gap is very likely to exist in young industries like the biotechnology industry, and is the inspiration for a growing body of research on the importance of firm intellectual capital disclosures (Mouritsen et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2006 ). There is a global trend and demand for more useful and comprehensive non-financial information about the operating activities of firms (Anderson and Epstein, 1996; GRI, 2006) . Research has demonstrated that companies in industries like the biotechnology industry need to bridge the information gap between managers and owners, as this can be critical to future capital-raising potential (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Barth et. al., 2001 ). In the study of Aboody and Lev (2000) , the importance of private information relating to R&D intellectual capital was demonstrated since firm managers were shown to gain because of their inside-information about this 1 -Research Paper 4 important knowledge commodity. More than half of the listed Australian biotechnology firms today are actively engaged in R&D-only activities. This could mean that there is potential within the Australian biotechnology industry for a net transfer of wealth to be occurring in favour of firm management over owners.
The intellectual capital statement, the meaning of its contents and its interpretation, seems a valid academic intellectual pursuit to build and transfer information about firm intangible value from managers to owners. The essential nature of an intellectual capital statement is that it attempts to disaggregate information that is not traditionally disclosed in a firm's balance sheet.
A recent critical finding from the intellectual capital literature is the importance of a 'knowledge narrative' to explain how knowledge is more than a token valuable, and how a knowledge management strategy and investments in knowledge resources make a difference to firm success . It has been clearly demonstrated that non-financial disclosures can positively impact upon management credibility, analysts' understanding, and investors' patience over poor performance (Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995) .
Firm failure to accept the importance of disclosing the value of their less tangible assets has been associated with certain negative consequences, including: 1) investors with small shareholdings having less access to information about a company's intangible assets than larger shareholders; 2) opportunistic behaviour of firm managers if information about intangibles remains private; and, 3) cost-of-capital may increase to non-disclosing firms because of risk assessment by investors and banks who can only value the company with information about its tangible property (Marr et al., 2003) .
In contrast to the negative consequences of non-disclosure there are some compelling arguments which justify non-disclosure of intellectual capital information, including: 1) the 'Transparency Drawback' of managers disclosing information which competitors can use strategically against 1 -Research Paper 5 them (Depoers, 2000) ; 2) regulatory barriers imposed by potential legal claims if private information becomes public; 3) prescriptive requirements of generally accepted accounting practices; 4) national culture (Chaminade and Johanson 2003) ; and, 5) the risk-averse behaviour of auditors when advising firms on annual report disclosures (Vergauwen and van Alem, 2005) .
Internationally, some countries have regulating intellectual capital reporting initiatives, these include: 1) Austrian legislation for intellectual capital reporting by all state-owned universities; (DMSTI, 2003) guidelines which have grown from the MERITUM project; 5) Japan's Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) white paper on corporate social responsibility and Japan's Nippon Keidanren (Japanese business federation) Charter of Corporate Behaviour; and, 6) The Global Reporting Initiative sustainability report (GRI, 2006) . The above summary of regulations and guidelines is a synopsis from the first of Prof. Wai Fong Chua's reports on extended performance reporting for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (Chua, 2005) .
In Australia there is no legal or GAAP requirement for public companies to produce end-of-year financial reports with information relating to intellectual capital, nor are they obliged to 1 A preliminary evaluation of the ASX/AusBiotech code of best practice and its guidance seem to indicate that it may not fulfil its objectives. The first six pages of the code guidance are preamble relaying ASX continuous disclosure requirements to the reader; pages seven to eighteen contain the actual guidance and seven of those pages relate solely to the treatment of information about intellectual property rights, regulatory filings, clinical trials and medical devices. It would appear from the code that the types of continuous disclosure which are being encouraged are highly-biased in favour of the type already disclosed best in the annual reports and on the web-sites of these companies: 1) registered intellectual property; 2) product technology already in late-stage commercialization; and, 3) clinical trial reports. Are regulatory authorities in Australia are trying to send a message that relatively "hard" intangibles (Stewart, 2001 ) are less likely to be fully disclosed, and are therefore in need of regulatory backing?
A key driver of the research on intellectual capital disclosure is the premise that mastering disclosure of "soft" intangibles like employee knowledge, customer relations, strategic vision and intellectual property management is where companies may need help and also ultimately is the key to uncovering an organization's value. These "soft" intangibles are the focus of narrative in well-defined intellectual capital statements which elucidate the value of firm intangibles using the three dimensions of human capital, organisational capital/internal relations and customer/external relations employees; 2) customers; 3) information technology; 4) processes; 5) research and development; and 6) strategic statement. In this study a number of independent variables will be used to examine the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and a firm's size, including: board independence, ownership concentration, age of the company and leverage.
The 2005 Australian annual reporting period is an interesting starting point for any planned longitudinal research on annual reporting disclosure practices since it will be the last before harmonization and the application of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Hypothesis Development
The central research question which is being addressed by this project can be presented as Traditional accounting disclosure papers focus almost exclusively on formulating research hypotheses within an Agency Theory conceptual framework, with its overarching themes of ownership, control, agency, opportunism and cost. This is an entirely appropriate theoretical framework within which to develop our current set of hypotheses. 1 -Research Paper 8 Agency theory, probably the central theory to all accounting theory, explains that separation of ownership and control in companies creates a moral hazard where managers, as agents for shareholder owners act for their own economic self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Positive accounting theory (PAT) is the branch of accounting theory which attempts to explain the manager agent's behaviour and accounting policy choice decisions. Considering the economic consequences of particular decisions, with regard to incentive and reward schemes put in place to motivate and reward them (Deegan, 2005; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Zeff, 1978) . In the changing global reporting environment today, managers should understand and address the important economic consequences of not making voluntary disclosures about the firm's intellectual capital base.
Size of the firm
Large companies are often scrutinized by particular stakeholder groups and therefore positive disclosure practices such as intellectual capital disclosure might be predicted if a firm is attempting to minimize political costs. This study uses market capitalization as a proxy for political visibility. In particular, work on the Australian oil and gas industry companies has shown that size is a significant factor impacting voluntary intellectual capital disclosure (Singh and VanderZahn, unpublished) . However, for Danish IPO prospectuses size was not a determinant for intellectual capital disclosure (Bukh, Nielsen et al. 2005 ). Bukh and others identify an earlier study by Robb et al. (2001) that found prospective and historical nonfinancial disclosures in the annual reports were affected by size and international operations.
Ownership concentration
Another determinant of intellectual capital disclosure that will be analysed here is ownership concentration. Ownership concentration is a measure of voting power distribution -either to the owners or the managers. Sometimes also measured as the proportion of management ownership, it represents a motivation for non-financial disclosures to aid alignment of interests between 1 -Research Paper 9 managers and owners. Low ownership concentration in firms is equated to manager control, whereas high ownership concentration firms are equated to owner control. Research to date has contributed conflicting accounts of whether ownership concentration is likely to be a determinant of intellectual capital disclosure in firm annual reports. For example, a significant relationship was demonstrated between ownership structure and voluntary segment disclosures in diversified Australian firms (McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993) , but Singh and VanderZahn's (unpublished) intellectual capital study confirms Craswell & Taylor's (1992) study of voluntary reserve disclosures, in that there was no significant association with ownership structure.
Board independence
The monitoring ability of the board will depend on its individual members' ability to represent the shareholders by assessing firm activities and controlling the behaviour of firm managers.
The percentage of independent directors on the board and the size of the board have both been positively associated with measured levels of disclosure in past studies (Craven and Wallace, 2001; Jaggi and Leung, 2006) . Bukh, Nielson et al. (2005) identify that company age has often been used in previous studies as a proxy for risk. From this perspective it might be expected that younger companies with 'less history' will be more reliant upon non-financial disclosures. In other words, prospective information about earnings will be more useful than limited historical data for investors to value the firm (Amir and Lev, 1996) . In Bukh's study above, they did not find that age was an explanatory factor for firm intellectual capital disclosures.
Age of the firm
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Traditional agency theory also predicts that highly leveraged firms which have significant obligations under existing debt covenants incur monitoring costs to reach equilibrium between self-interested managers as agents for external debt-holders (Dhaliwal et al., 1982) . The paper of Watts and Zimmerman (1986) further explains that the more external financing that is employed by an organization the more management will attempt to use different policies for their own benefit. While Singh and VanderZahn (unpublished) find there is a significant positive correlation between oil and gas firm leverage and intellectual capital disclosure they also review two other papers with contrary results. A positive correlation between firm leverage and voluntary segment disclosures was found by Bradbury (1992) . No relationship was found between the same two variables measured in New Zealand firms (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987 ).
The research detailed above has led us to make the following null hypotheses: 
Methodology
This paper uses a 78-item disclosure index developed by Bukh, Nielson et al. (2005) . The disclosure index is a method of scoring particular information disclosures using either a one for 'yes' and zero for 'no' for each item. This categorical record is then converted into a percentage index of disclosure for each company by dividing the sum of disclosures by the denominator of total items measured. In the publication by Bukh, Nielson et al. (2005) intellectual capital disclosures are divided into six categories: employee, customer, information technology, processes, research and development and strategic statement, which are scored from 27, 14, 5, 8, 9 and 15 individual items, respectively -a total of 78 individual items.
Marston and Shrives' review paper (1991) provides a clear outline of why disclosure indices are a valid empirical method for data collection and measurement of information content in company annual reports. The early work of Gray and others (Gray et al. 1984) has demonstrated that scoring annual reports using the methods outline above can give valuable insight to the level of particular disclosures. There are alternative methods for gathering intellectual capital information from annual reports (Guthrie et al., 2004 , Guthrie et al. 2000 and as a form of content analysis are equally as valid as the use of a disclosure index. Guthrie and others identify a number of studies in which intellectual capital information content has been measured in 1 -Research Paper company annual reports using alternative methods (Bozzolan et al., 2003; Brennan, 2001; Guthrie et al., 1999 Guthrie et al., , 2003 Olsson, 2001) .
Originally data was collected for 102 companies, but after excluding duplicates and outliers, to satisfy assumptions of normality for linear regression, the final sample of companies for analysis was n=96. The raw data voluntary intellectual capital disclosure score for each item, The largest employer company of the sample had a global workforce of just over 7,000; the smallest employer company had just a handful of employees. Companies of the sample had an average market capitalization of AUD$ 158 million; the lowest for a single company was AUD$ 1.7 million and the highest was AUD$ 6.34 billion. Share market data at the time of writing of this paper revealed that all listed biotechnology stocks represented only about 3% of equity market capitalization in Australia.
The approach in this study was to start with a valid instrument with a reasonably detailed item checklist of potential intellectual capital disclosures. This instrument and a range of possible independent variable data fields were constructed into a data collection worksheet. In total, five research staff were employed to collect the data with any one individual's maximum and minimum contribution being 13% and 36%, respectively. After the data collection worksheet was reviewed, each research staff member was given two company annual reports to score. The scoring of the initial reports from each individual was reviewed for consistency. If there was a significant difference in the IC disclosure index without adequate explanation, the collection 1 -Research Paper 13 worksheet was reviewed and that individual given another two reports to score. After some consistency was achieved, individuals were given batches of ten reports to score and return for data entry. Separate analysis of data from the 36% and 21% of the sample companies which were collected by two different individuals showed similar correlation and relationships for the regression model as for the whole sample (data not shown). This gives a high degree of confidence in the overall result for the sample and reduces the likelihood that differences in scoring method for any one individual collector are a contributing factor to the results in this study.
Since the annual reports are the main communication channel for Australian listed companies, this study will focus on the intellectual capital disclosures in the 2005 financial year end annual reports. Annual reports are widely distributed and publicly available, and the voluntary disclosures made in the annual reports are at the discretion of management. As such, information that is disclosed by other means, such as on the company web-site, is not included in this study.
Measure of Intellectual Capital disclosure (Dependent variable)
The 78-item disclosure index originally developed by Bukh, Nielson et al. (2005) to measure intellectual capital disclosures in Danish company IPO prospectuses is used in this study. The percentage of the disclosure index as a total is calculated in accordance with the following formula which was presented in the above publication.
Score = (Σ d i /M) x 100%
Score = Disclosure index dependent variable (ICDIndex, in this study) di = expresses item i when the item's value is 1 with disclosure and 0 when there was no disclosure. 1 -Research Paper 14 M is 78 which is the total number of items being measured. Bukh, Nielsen et al. (2005) refer to support for the conclusion that an extensive list of items scored in this fashion can be ranked equally since an extensive list of items results in gradual equalization (Firth, 1979) , and other studies have found in cases like this that weighting produces little difference in the final results (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987 ).
Measures of independence, age, ownership concentration and leverage (Independent variables)
Factors affecting firm disclosures were identified through Agency Theory. Variables used to capture each independent variable are discussed below.
Independence
The independence of the board of directors of the biotechnology companies was measured by the number of independent directors on the board in the 2005 financial year as a percentage of total number of directors of the company. This data was available from the second item in the Australian company's corporate governance statement, and is a mandatory annual report disclosure required by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rules (Structure the board to add value).
Age
The age of the companies were measured in months from the date of incorporation to the end of 
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The ownership concentration in each company was measured as the percentage of total shares on issue that were held by the twenty largest shareholders. This was measured shortly after the end of the 2005 financial year.
Leverage
The level of external financing of the companies was measured by the ratio of total liabilities over total assets at the end of the 2005 financial year.
Measure of size (Control variable)
There is no definitive measure of political visibility but size has been used as a proxy for political visibility in a number of empirical studies, and measures of size which have been applied include total assets, total sales and in the case of this study market capitalization (Astami & Tower, 2006; Bowen et al 1981; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) . Table I provide a description of the dependent, independent and control variables measured and analysed in this study. Table I "
"take in
Data analyses
The data collected for this study was analysed through the use of bivariate correlation and linear regression analysis using SPSS version 14.0 software. Backward regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses. The main regression model is: λ j = the coefficient on the intercept term;
β j = the coefficients 1 through 5 on the independent and control variables; and η j = the error term. where the mean disclosure index of intellectual capital was 27.6% for n=7.
Results
Descriptive statistics
In this study, another industry group equivalent that was studied also had a high index compared to the current: IT and technology companies in Bukh et al. (2005) "take in Table II" Correlation matrix analysis Table III presents between ICDIndex and LnAge (r = 0.249, p=0.014) is consistent with the proposition that biotechnology firms which have been incorporated for a longer period of time will disclose more voluntary intellectual capital information. It might be expected that with a mean age of only 12 years the 96 sample companies on average would be more reliant on intellectual capital disclosures than older companies. This finding does not support the proposition that nonfinancial disclosures will be more useful as a tool for younger companies to inform market participants about their future permanent income prospects (Amir and Lev, 1996) .
A significant correlation is also found between ICDIndex and LnLeverage (r=0.207, p= 0.043), supporting the notion that the more highly leveraged firms may provide greater disclosure of information to minimise their agency costs of debt (Dhaliwal et al., 1982) . This paper corroborates the findings of Singh and VanderZahn (Curtin University, unpublished) in the oil and gas industry where a significant positive correlation was demonstrated between leverage and the levels of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. Although less applicable to the current scenario, but also related to voluntary disclosure: Bradbury (1992) found a positive correlation between firm leverage and voluntary segment disclosures.
Significant and positive correlations between independent and control variables are noted.
LnMarkCap is positively and significantly correlated with LnAge which is entirely expected (r=0.227, p=0.026). Multicollinearity is not a concern in this study as the maximum Pearson correlation values are below the critical value of 0.8 (Hair, et al., 1995; Greene, 1999) .
"take in Table III" Multiple Regression Analysis Results The results of backward linear regression analysis between ICDIndex and the independent variables in the above model indicate that coefficient for LnLeverage (p=0.059) is moderately significant when compared with ICDIndex. This finding is consistent with expectations, supporting the hypothesis that highly leveraged firms disclose more voluntary intellectual capital information because it may reduce monitoring costs and agency costs of debt to balance the opposing needs of managers and debt-holders (Dhaliwal et al., 1982) . Supporting the board independence hypothesis, the regression results show that there is a very significant relationship between Ln%Indep and ICDIndex (p=0.030). The significance of this result indicates that the structure of the board in these biotechnology companies is a factor in determining the level of intellectual capital disclosures. As outlined in the hypothesis section earlier the structure of the board is of vital significance to assessing firm activities and controlling managers' behaviour. So it appears that the level of board independence in biotechnology companies is an important determining factor in the firms levels of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure (Craven and Wallace, 2001; Jaggi and Leung, 2006) .
"take in Table IV"
The most significant result of the regression is that the relationship of size (LnMarkCap) and
ICDIndex was demonstrated to a high level (p<0.000). To further investigate the effect of size, the dataset was separated into large and small firms. Firms whose LnMarkCap is equal to or above the mean are considered large, while firms that fall below the mean are small firms. A backwards regression was conducted to identify the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. The General Linear Model used is:
ICDIIndex j = λ j + β 1 %Top20Sh j + β 2 LnLeverage j + β 3 LnAge j + β 4 Ln%Indep j + η j 1 -Research Paper
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The results shown in Table V indicate that the model proposed is only relevant for large biotechnology firms. Board independence (Ln%Indep) and leverage (LnLeverage) were both statistically significant only for the companies with LnMarkCap greater than or equal to the mean, indicating that an increase in board independence and leverage is associated with an increase in the disclosure of intellectual capital items in the annual report for large firms only.
"take in Table V significantly (Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995 (Nielsen et al., 2006) . What meaning can be attributed to the content of intellectual capital disclosures is otherwise outside the considerations of this paper.
This investigation has demonstrated that Australia's biotechnology company's generally disclose less about intellectual capital in their annual reports than could be expected from the results of prior research . There is strong positive correlations between the level of voluntary intellectual capital disclosures and board independence, firm age, firm size and the level of leverage. There was no correlation between disclosure practice and the level of ownership concentration indicating that institutional shareholders may not be lobbying management and the board for greater accountability. The relationship between the above correlations was further investigated in the large and small biotechnology companies and it was discovered that board independence and leverage were only determinants of intellectual capital disclosure in large biotechnology firms. This is an interesting result in the light of Bukh et al. prospectus is likely to be much stronger than for the relatively conservative annual reporting process of firms investigated during this study.
Another contributing fact to the higher levels of disclosure in prospectuses might derive from considering regulatory concessions allowed for the IPO process. The low ICDIndex score in this 1 -Research Paper 22 study are consistent with the findings of Singh and VanderZahn (Curtin University, unpublished) for the Australian oil and gas industry.
These results clearly indicate that Australian biotechnology firms as a whole are organizations which do not disclose intellectual capital information well. The emphasis is on disclosure of information about strategy and research and development activity, and in organizations which rely heavily on highly-educated and skilful employees there is comparatively little disclosure of employee-related items. This might partly be explained by a desire that the firms have to protect this intangible knowledge base from the attention of potential rivals, and takeover or poaching activities.
The overall implications of our findings are that smaller biotechnology companies' managers are not motivated by external debt-providers' demands to make voluntary disclosures about intangible firm-value. In contrast external debt-providers were demonstrated to bring pressure upon the management of large biotechnology companies. Predictably, large biotechnology companies' boards were better able to establish board independence which was shown to link back to more comprehensive intellectual capital reporting.
Limitations
Because this study has been conducted exclusively with Australian biotechnology companies it is important to emphasize the potential impact any Australian regulation may have had upon the financial reporting process which was analysed. In the introduction above we discussed the It is important to stress that this study has been conducted on a company annual reporting period for one year. A future longitudinal study is planned to discount the possibility that the results collated for this paper were subject to error because of sampling from only one financial year.
Future Research
An interesting recommendation for further research would be to investigate some of the other drivers of intangible value for biotechnology and research and development intensive firms. 
